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Abstract: Lightweight cryptography is a rapidly evolving area of research and it has great impact especially on the
new computing environment called the Internet of Things (IoT) or the Smart Object networks (Holler et al.,
2014), where lots of constrained devices are connected on the Internet and exchange information on a daily
basis. Every year there are many new submissions of cryptographic primitives which are optimized towards
both software and hardware implementation so that they can operate in devices which have limited resources
of hardware and are subject to both power and energy consumption constraints. In 2013, two families of
ultra-lightweight block ciphers were proposed, SIMON and SPECK, which come in a variety of block and
key sizes and were designed to be optimized in hardware and software implementation respectively (Beaulieu
et al., 2013). In this paper, we study the security of the 64-bit SIMON with 128-bit key against advanced
forms of differential cryptanalysis using truncated differentials (Knudsen, 1995; Courtois et al., 2014a). We
follow similar method as the one proposed in SECRYPT 2013 (Courtois and Mourouzis, 2013) in order to
heuristically discover sets of differences that propagate with sufficiently good probability and allow us to
combine them efficiently in order to construct large-round statistical distinguishers. We present a 22-round
distinguisher which we use it in a depth-first key search approach to develop an attack against 24 and 26 rounds
with complexity 2124.5 and 2126 SIMON encryptions respectively. Our methodology provides a framework
for extending distinguishers to attacks to a larger number of rounds assuming truncated differential properties
of relatively high probability were discovered.
1 INTRODUCTION
The new computing environment of Internet of
Things (IoT) is the network of physical objects em-
bedded with electronics, software, sensors and con-
nectivity to achieve greater value and user experience
(Holler et al., 2014; Mark, 2014). All these inter-
connected devices will exchange lots of data with the
manufacturer or operator or any other connected de-
vice in a daily basis in order to improve performance
and decrease power consumption. On the same time
all these data will be aggregated and being used for
building fault prediction models and other models that
could be used to benefit our the experience.
In order to enjoy this new environment we need to
guarantee the security of the nodes of the network up
to a desired level. The challenge in this space lies in
the implementation of secure enough cryptographic
functions on constrained devices due to the limita-
tion of their resources such as hardware availabil-
ity and power and energy consumption constraints.
Lightweight cryptography is the area of cryptography
which aims to develop more efficient cryptographic
primitives in response to typical constraints in hard-
ware and optimized towards both power and energy
consumption. As a result of this great demand of op-
timizing the performance, every year there are many
submissions of lightweight cryptosystems which are
designed towards both hardware and software imple-
mentation.
In July 2013, a team of cryptographers from Na-
tional Security Agency (NSA) has proposed two new
interesting lightweight block ciphers, SIMON and
SPECK (Beaulieu et al., 2013). Both ciphers come
in a variety of block and key sizes and were designed
towards optimization in hardware and software re-
spectively. In the same paper there was no advanced
analysis of the security of these ciphers against well-
known cryptanalytic attacks such as differential, lin-
ear and algebraic cryptanalysis. In the same year of
submission, we had many different attacks against
reduced-round versions of both ciphers such as; dif-
ferential cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis, impossi-
ble differentials and combined differential algebraic
techniques (cf. Table 1 and Table 2).
It is very important to note that SIMON has very
low multiplicative complexity, 32 multiplications per
round, which implies low non-linearity. Courtois et
al demonstrated that several rounds (10/44) of this ci-
pher can be attacked by pure algebraic attacks without
even guessing any key bits (Courtois et al., 2014b).
This is somehow reconfirms the heuristical approach
that multiplicative complexity reduction can reduce
the complexity of the underlying algebraic system and
thus a solution can be recovered by a solver soft-
ware, such as a SAT solver, in a more reasonable time
(Courtois and Bard, 2007; Courtois et al., 2011).
Table 1: Cryptanalysis of SIMON64/128
Authors Rounds Time
(Alkhzaimi and Lauridsen, 2013) 26 294
(Farzaneh et al., 2013) 24 258.4
(Farzaneh et al., 2013) 16 292.0
(Courtois et al., 2014b) 10 298.8
This paper 26 2126
Table 2: Type of attacks against SIMON64/128
Authors Type
(Alkhzaimi and Lauridsen, 2013) Differential
(Farzaneh et al., 2013) Differential
(Farzaneh et al., 2013) Imp-Diff
(Courtois et al., 2014b) Alg-Trunc
This paper Trunc
In this paper, we evaluate the security of 64-bit
version of SIMON with 128-bit key against advanced
forms of differential cryptanalysis using large-round
statistical distinguishers. We employ a simple heuris-
tical approach in order to discover truncated differen-
tial properties that hold with sufficiently high proba-
bility, similar to the method proposed in (Courtois and
Mourouzis, 2013; Courtois et al., 2014a). Our heuris-
tical approach includes analysis of patterns of several
transitions of low Hamming-distance pairs.
We manage to construct a 22-round distinguisher
by combining several truncated differential properties
and then we use this distinguisher to attack 24 and
26 rounds of the cipher in a depth-first search style
approach as proposed in (Mourouzis, 2014). This
method invlolves several key guessing for several
outer rounds and measuring the number of plaintext
and ciphertext pairs that follow the specified input-
output differences of the statistical distinguisher.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:
• Section 2: We provide an introduction to SIMON
cipher and we study especially its round function
and key schedule algorithm for the particular 64-
bit version.
• Section 3: We provide an introduction to differen-
tial cryptanalysis and in particular truncated dif-
ferentials.
• Section 4: We discuss construction of large-round
statistical distinguishers using truncated differen-
tial properties.
• Section 5: We present a 22-round distinguisher
for SIMON64/128.
• Section 6: We mount a differential attacks against
24 and 26 rounds of SIMON using statistical dis-
tinguishers.
• Section 7: Conclusions and Future Research
2 SIMON CIPHER
SIMON is a lightweight block cipher designed by
NSA. with the aim to have optimal hardware perfor-
mance (Beaulieu et al., 2013). It follows the classi-
cal Feistel design paradigm and operates on two n-bit
halves in each round.
Each round of SIMON applies a non-linear, non-
bijective function F : GF(2)n → GF(2)n to the left
half of the state which is repeated for 44 rounds. The
operations used are as follows:
1. bitwise XOR,
2. bitwise AND and
3. left circular shift, S j by j bits.
We denote the input to thei-th round by Li−1||Ri−1
and in each round the left word Li−1 is used as input
to the round function F defined by,
F(Li−1)= (Li−1 <<< 1).(Li−1 <<< 8)⊕(Li−1 <<< 2),
(1)
where . is the bitwise AND operator.
The next state Li||Riis computed in the following
way (cf. Figure 1),
Li = Ri−1⊕F(Li−1)⊕Ki−1 (2)
Ri = Li−1 (3)
Figure 1: The round function of the SIMON block cipher.
The output of the last round is the ciphertext af-
ter applying the round function for 44 times for the
particular variant SIMON64/128.
Note that SIMON cipher has a very low multi-
plicative complexity since the only non-linear part is
the bitwise multiplication, resulting in 32 multiplica-
tions per round. Multiplicative complexity is known
to be a measure of non-linearity and hence a (heuris-
tic) measure against resistance to known forms of
cryptanalytics attacks against hash functions (Boyar
et al., 2013) and block ciphers (Courtois et al., 2011).
SIMON’s key schedule is based on an LSFR-like
procedure (cf. Figure 2). The nm-bits of the key are
used to generate the keys K0,K1, ...,Kr−1 to be used
as round keys. There are three different key schedule
procedures depending on the number of words that the
secret key consists of (m = 2,3,4). In the particular
version of the cipher we study, we are interested in the
version where m = 4.
Furthermore, at the beginning K0,K1, ...,Km−1 are
initialized keys, while the remaining are generated by
the LSFR- like construction which is depicted on Fig-
ure 2. For the variant of our interest, where m= 4, the
rest of the keys are generated as follows:
Y = Ki+1⊕ (Ki+3 >>> 3) (4)
Ki+4 = Ki⊕Y ⊕ (Y >>> 1)⊕ c⊕ (z j)i (5)
The constant c = 0x f f ... f c is used for preventing
slide attacks and attacks exploiting rotational symme-
tries (Beaulieu et al., 2013).
In addition, the generated subkeys are xored with
a bit (zj)i, that denotes the i-th bit from the one of the
five constant sequences z0, ...,z4 . These sequences
are defined in (Beaulieu et al., 2013) and for our vari-
ant we use z3.
The way that the key schedule operates it implies
that if we recover lots of key bits from the very first
rounds, then we have higher chances of recovering
next bits since they are generated in a LSFR-like ap-
proach. In the methodology we describe in the next
sections we focus on recovering several key bits from
the very first rounds of encryption.
Figure 2: The SIMON two, three and four-word key expan-
sions.
3 DIFFERENTIAL
CRYPTANALYSIS
Differential Cryptanalysis is a general form of
probabilistic or statistical cryptanalytic technique that
is primarily applicable to block ciphers but also to
stream ciphers and cryptographic hash functions. It
belongs to the category of chosen-plaintext attacks
and its discovery was attributed to Eli Biham and Adi
Shamir in the later 1980s (Biham and Shamir, 1993;
Biham and Shamir, 1990).
However, around 1994, Don Coppersmith as a
member pf the original IBM DES team, confirmed
that the technique of DC was known to IBM, as early
as 1974. In addition, he said that one of the secu-
rity criteria used to design DES was the resistance
against this particular type of attack and this attack
was known as T- attack or Tickle attack.
In this type of attack, the main task is to study
the propagation of differences of inputs from round to
round inside the cipher, and discover specific differ-
ences that propagate with comparatively higher prob-
ability as the probability expected assuming a uni-
form distribution. In this way, an attacker discov-
ers where the cipher exhibits non-random behavior
and by exploiting these properties further can recover
parts of the secret key or the full key with time com-
plexity lower than an exhaustive search on the key
length which is the reference time complexity in case
of block ciphers.
In differential attacks, the first task is to find series
of input and output differences over several rounds,
which appear with relatively high probability. For
each pair of input-output difference, we need to de-
termine the probability of propagation for each round
individually. For the linear components, we can pre-
dict the propagation of the difference with probability
one. However, in non-linear components, such as S-
boxes, a probabilistic analysis is needed.
Figure 3: The diagram on the left illustrates the propaga-
tion of differences (0),(1), ...,(r) through different rounds,
which is called differential characteristic. The diagram on
the right illustrates a differential, where only input-output
differences are considered, while middle differences are ig-
nored.
We can either construct round to round paths and
join them together to form a larger round differen-
tial characteristic or we can search directly for spe-
cific input-output differences after a certain number
of rounds and this is called differential. Figure 3 illus-
trates both differential characteristic and differential.
3.0.1 Truncated Differentials
Truncated Differential Cryptanalysis is a gener-
alization of differential cryptanalysis developed by
Lars Knudsen (Knudsen, 1995). Usually, in DC we
study the propagation of single differences between
two plaintexts, while in truncated DC we consider dif-
ferences that are partially determined (i.e we are inter-
ested only in some parts of the difference). This tech-
nique has been successfully applied to many block ci-
phers such as SAFER, IDEA, Skipjack, Twofish and
many others. We define the truncation T RUNC(a) of
a n-bit string a as in Definition 1.
Definition 1. (Truncation, (Knudsen, 1995))
Let a = a0a1...an−1 be an n-bit string, then its
truncation is the n-bit string b given by b0b1..bn−1 =
T RUNC(a0a1..an−1), where either bi = ai or bi = ∗,
for all 0≤ i≤ n−1 and ∗ is an unknown value
The notion of truncated differentials (cf. Defini-
tion 2) extends naturally to differences.
Definition 2. (Truncated Differentials, (Knudsen,
1995))
Let (α,β) be an i-round differential, then if α′ and
β′ are truncations of α and β respectively, then (α′,β′)
is an i-round truncated differential.
Remark 1. Note that we need to exclude the zero dif-
ference from our set.
Example 1. The truncated differential on 8 bytes of
the form 0000000000∗00000 (in hexadecimal repre-
sentation), where ∗= x1x2x3x4, is a set of differences
of size 16−1 (excluding the zero difference).
Given an s-round characteristic ∆0→ ∆1→ ...→
∆s, then ∆′0→ ∆′1→ ...→ ∆′s is a truncated character-
istic, if ∆′i = T RUNC(∆i) for 0 ≤ i ≤ s. A truncated
characteristic predicts only part of the difference in a
pair of texts after each round of encryption. A trun-
cated differential is a collection of truncated charac-
teristics. Truncated differentials proved to be a very
useful cryptanalytic tool against many block ciphers
which at first glance seem secure against basic differ-
ential cryptanalysis.
In the next section we employ a simple heuristic
discovery algororithm for discovering truncated dif-
ferential properties which propagate with sufficiently
high probability. In a later stage we combine these
properties to construct a large round distinguisher
which we use to mount a differential attack on a larger
number of rounds.
4 LARGE-ROUND STATISTICAL
DISTINGUISHERS
4.0.2 Hypothesis Testing
In cryptanalysis, we very often study the problem
of distinguishing distributions, one distribution that
describes the variable of the number of certain events
that occur at random and another distribution that de-
scribes the same variable but due to propagation in-
side the cipher. Thus, we would like to design a clever
distinguisher which would be able to distinguish a
given a cipher from a random permutation by captur-
ing as much as possible of its mathematical structure.
Such a distinguishing attack might reveal information
which can be used to reduce the space of the key can-
didates and thus lead to an attack faster than exhaus-
tive search. In cryptographic literature, there are sev-
eral examples of succesful attacks against either the
full block cipher or some reduced-round version or
more frequently against stream ciphers.
Thus, this can be seen as a hypothesis testing prob-
lem of distinguishing the two distributions as shown
in Figure 2. Suppose that a source is used to gener-
ate independent random samples in some given finite
set with some distribution P , which is either P = P0
or P = P1. A distinguisher is a construction used
to determine which one is the most likely the one
which was used to generate the sample. Hence, the
overall attack based on the distinguishers considers
the following underlying statistical hypothesis test-
ing problem, where we have either a null hypothesis
H0 : P = P0 or an alternative hypothesis H1 : P = P1.
Our scope is to study this hypothesis problem ap-
plied to differential cryptanalysis and its variants. The
variable of our interest is the number of plaintext
pairs whose output difference after r rounds lies in
a particular truncated differential set ∆Y given that
their difference lies in another truncated differential
set ∆X . We aim to use particular sets of differences
which capture the mathematical structure of the ci-
pher and these are known as general open sets and we
described them in the previous section.
Assuming that we have two random variables W
and R which are described by Gaussian distributions
with parameters (E(W ),V (W )) and (E(R),V (R)) re-
spectively. Our task is given a measurement of the
variable of our interest to determine from which dis-
tribution this sample is more likely to be taken. Thus,
we have the following hypothesis testing problem,
H0 : P =W and H1 : P = R . For cryptanalytic pur-
poses, we assume that distribution W corresponds to
a wrong key, while R corresponds to the right key. In
case of a Gaussian distribution, the probability den-
sity function of distribution W is given by the fol-
lowing equation,
fW (x) =
1√
2piV (W )
exp−
1
2V (W ) (x−E(W ))2 . (6)
Assume that we were given a sample P from
which we can observe x events of our interest, in
the particular case of differential cryptanalysis is the
number of pairs which follow the differential α→ β
after r rounds. Then, from Figure 2 we observe that
if x is greater than E(R) then we can assume that
that this observation corresponds to the right key with
probability set to 12 . On the other hand, the probabil-
ity of a false positive, for example accepting the key
as correct while it is wrong, which is also known as
Type I error, is represented by the red-shaded region
in Figure 4 and given by the following formulae,
P(W >R )=
∫ ∞
E(R)
fW (x)dx=
1
2
(1−er f (E(R)−E(W )√
2V (W )
)
(7)
where er f (x) is the Gaussian error function given
by
er f (x) =
2√
pi
∫ x
0
exp−t
2
dt. (8)
Figure 4: The two Gaussian distributions corresponding to
wrong key guess (red) and right key guess (green). The red-
shaded region corresponds to the probability of false posi-
tives or Type I error value.
In terms of Type II error (right key rejection) we
set it to constant probability 12 . This is achieved by
simply accepting a certain key bits assumptios as cor-
rect if the number of observed pairs of our interest
(truncated differential propertied verified) exceeds the
mean of the Gauss distribution corresponding to the
right key which is E(R) in our example.
In the next section we describe how to construct
a 22-round distinguisher for SIMON cipher. Then,
we use this distinguisher to mount an attack against a
larger number of rounds.
5 CONSTRUCTION OF
22-ROUND DISTINGUISHERS
In this section we combine several truncated dif-
ferential properties in order to construct a 22-round
distinguisher. In particular, we combine two transi-
tions discovered to propagate with sufficiently high
probability for 10 and 2 rounds. The transitions are
shown on Figure 5.
In order to compute the probability of a transition
we use a very simple algorithm that simply counts
the number of events of our interest for a given fixed
number of trials. We assume that the distribution of
the number of events of our interest follows (approx-
imately) a Poisson distribution. We use this distribu-
tion as we have experimentally observed that for all
cases we have tried,
• We have a discrete distribution of small integers
• In all cases we have tried and are included in this
thesis the variance is relatively close to the mean.
For a sample of sizeN if x denotes the number
of events that were observed (approximated by Pois-
son with parameter Poisson mean N p where p is the
true mean), then the approximated Standard Devia-
tion (SD) of the variable xN , where N is assumed
to be constant and p the observed mean, is given
by
√
N p/N =
√
p/N . This is because the variance
equals to the mean in case of a Poisson distribution.
Let I1 be the interval [pt
√
p′/N, p+ t
√
p/N]. In
our simulations we would like I1 to be contained in the
interval I2 = [p.2a, p.2a], where a is an error we allow
in the exponent of the mean as a power of 2. We as-
sume that the true mean that we are aiming to approx-
imate by simulations is bigger than some probability
value p0 in order to ensure that our algorithm termi-
nates in reasonable time. The inclusion of sets implies
that we need to run N > N0 simulations, where N0 is
given by
N0 =
22at2
(2a−1)2 .
1
p0
(9)
in order to achieve the desired precision. Since
we record the mean xN we expect by Central Limit
Theorem that the distribution of our mean converges
to a Normal Distribution.
Following precisely this methodology we end up
in the problem of distinguishing the following two
Gaussian distributions.
• Natural Propagation: X: N (212,26)
• SIMON: Y: N (212+27,
√
(212+27))
Figure 5: A 22-round statistical distinguisher.
Explanation: We have in total 263.23 = 266
pairs of plaintexts (P,P′) that satisfy P ⊕ P′ ∈
[0000002200000080]. A proportion 210/264 is ex-
pected to have a ciphertext difference C ⊕ C′ ∈
[0A50002209010008] by accident (random permuta-
tion) after either a large number of rounds or by sim-
ply at random, which implies 212 pairs. Now in case
of SIMOn we expect 266−17.0−38.0−4.0 = 27 to fol-
low this truncated differential path with the speci-
fied differences in the middle. Since these distribu-
tion converge to Gauss distributions, but the underly-
ing source of generating samples is approximated by
Poisson, we can assume that the standard deviation
can be computed by the square root of the mean.
The other problem that we need to consider is
the problem of the number of pairs that by accident
have also this intermediate differences after 10 and
20 rounds as specified by the distinguisher. For this
particular example, we have that 216.2−17−38 are ex-
pected to have these intermediate differences which
implies it is zero and thus the two sets of events are
completely disjoint.
Note that we follow the following hypothesis test-
ing; if the number of pairs observed during the attack
exceeds 212 + 27 then we accept the key assumption
as correct, otherwise we reject it. This implies that
the Type II error of our attack is automatically set to
half. That implies that we have to repeat twice our at-
tack in order to retrieve the correct key, More details
about Type II error (false key assumption acceptance)
is analyzed in the next chapter.
6 DIFFERENTIAL ATTACKS
AGAINST 24 AND 26 ROUNDS
OF SIMON
In this section we present attacks against reduced
round versions of SIMON64/128 using the statisti-
cal distinguisher we have constructed and presented
in the previous section. Our distinguisher combines
several truncated differential properties for 10+10+2
rounds, resulting in a 22-round distinguisher with
Type I error 2−4.5 while Type II error is set to half.
To sum up, Type I error corresponds to false pos-
itives, i.e. the number of wrongly accepted keys as
correct by following the distinguisher construction for
given pairs of plaintext and ciphertexts. The attack
that we describe is a depth-first key search like ap-
proach, where we guess a specified set of key bits
for each round in order to determine the number of
plaintext-ciphertext pairs that follows the differences
as specified by the statistical distinguisher.
As we have already mentioned in the previous sec-
tion we are interested in distinguishing the following
two Gauss distributions,
• Natural Propagation: X: N (212,26)
• SIMON: Y: N (212+27,
√
(212+27))
The Type I error for this case can be computed
by computing the ration 2
7
26 = 2 which corresponds to
Type I error 2−4.5 by computing the associated Gauss
Error function.
We present two attacks, one against 24 rounds of
SIMON and another one, but essentially weaker at-
tack, on 26 rounds of SIMON. The aim of these at-
tacks is to show the generic nature of our attack that
makes use of a well-constructed distinguisher to at-
tack several number of rounds. Importantly, the per-
formance of this distinguisher can be improved if bet-
ter ad-hoc heuristics regarding the structure of the ci-
pher are discovered or there is a significant improve-
ment in the discovery method. Figure 6 illustrates pre-
cisely our steps in our attack.
6.0.3 Attack against 24 rounds
Consider a partition of 24 rounds of SIMON as
2+22, where 22 is the distinguisher but inverted. Note
that we do not have to guess full round keys but we are
only interested in guessing the key bits which allows
to check if the path of the plaintext pairs gives colli-
sions on the 0s of the truncated differential masks in
the input of the distinguisher.
1. For each of the 28+26 key bits of k1,k2 do the
following
2. Compute the partial encryption of all 264 plain-
texts for the first two rounds under the selected
key bits defined in the previous step.
3. Set a counter T = 0.
4. If all corresponding bits after 2 rounds of encryp-
tion equal to 0 for the selected key bits as specified
in the truncated differential mask, then increase T
by 1.
5. Repeat this for all 264 P-C pairs.
6. If T > 212 + 26 accept the key bits as correct for
the round keys k1,k2.
7. Out of the total 228+26 key assumption we expect
to filter out 249.5 cases to continue the attack
8. Brute force on the rest 128−28−26= 74 key bits
by requesting more pairs of plaintext-ciphertext.
9. Repeat the attack for another time
The time complexity of this attack is computed by
computing the complexity in each step. Intially we
have to perform 228+26.264 = 2118 encryptions. We
are left with 249.5 cases to continue the attack. The
complexity for the rest steps is 254−4.5−74 = 2123.5.
Thus, the total time complexity is 2123.5 and data com-
plexity 264. The overall complexity due to Type II
error is 2124.5.
6.0.4 Attack against 26 rounds
In this section we use a partition of 26 rounds as
2+22+2, where the middle 22 rounds is the statistical
distinguisher. The attack is summarized below.
1. For each of the (28+26)+(30+31) key bits of
k1,k2,k25,k26 do the following
2. Compute the partial encryption of all 264 plain-
texts for the first two and last two rounds under
the selected key bits defined in the previous step.
3. Set a counter T = 0.
4. If all corresponding bits aequal to 0 for the se-
lected key bits as specified in the truncated differ-
ential masks, then increase T by 1.
5. Repeat this for all 264 P-C pairs.
6. If T > 212 + 26 accept the key bits as correct for
the round keys k1,k2,k25,k+26.
7. Out of the total 228+26+30+31 key assumption we
expect to filter out 2110.5 cases to continue the at-
tack
8. Brute force on the rest 128−28−26= 74 key bits
by requesting more pairs of plaintext-ciphertext.
9. Repeat the attack for another time
The data complexity for this attack is 264 as we
again use the entire codebook. The time complex-
ity of the first step is (228+26+230+31).264 = 2125 SI-
MON encryptions. Then, we have to bruteforce on
the rest 254−4.5+74 = 2123.5 to get the correct key. The
total time complexity turns out to be 2126 due to Type
II error.
Note that we have not optimized the number of
key bits required to be guessed in the final steps
to recover k3,k4 by knowning lots of key bits from
k1,k2,k25,k26. In order to do this we need to analyze
the LFSR-like key schedule and this could be our fu-
ture work.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Lightweight cryptography is the field of cryptogra-
phy that studies the level of security of cryptographic
algorithms designed to be implemented and run ef-
ficiently on constrained devices. Nowadays, as we
move closer to the evolution of Internet of Things
(IoT) network (Holler et al., 2014), where a lot of
constrained devices will be connected on the internet
and exchange information, the concept of lightweight
cryptography gets even more attraction. Constructing
an algorithm with the aim to run efficiently on lim-
ited hardware constraints, optimal power consump-
tion and simultaneously offer a desired level of se-
curity is a highly non-trivial optimization task. Ev-
ery year researchers are proposing new lightweight ci-
phers that are designed based on the security and limi-
tation in hardware optimization task in mind. In 2013,
a team of researchers from NSA published two new
families of lightweight ciphers, SIMON and Speck,
which are designed towards hardware and software
implementation respectively. In this paper, our aim
is to evaluate the level of security that the 64-bit
version of SIMON that uses a 128-bit key offers,
against advanced forms of differential cryptanalysis
and especially against truncated differentials (Knud-
sen.,1995). Truncated differentials is a powerful form
of advanced differential cryptanalysis and it was used
to break ciphers which initially seem to be secure
against nave differential cryptanalysis, such as for ex-
ample GOST (Courtois et al., 2013). In this paper,
we follow the idea suggested by Courtois et al in SE-
CRYPT 2013 to extend statistical distinguishers to at-
tacks against either the full number of rounds of the
cipher or a selected number of rounds. We achieve in
obtaining a 26-round attack against 26(/44) rounds of
SIMON with time complexity 2126 SIMON encryp-
tions and 264 plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Importantly,
this attack is not optimized as we can update the dis-
covery method to obtain even better truncated differ-
ential properties which will enable us to either build
stronger statistical distinguishers or extend our distin-
guishers to more than 22 rounds and this would be a
topic of our future research.
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